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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUDEAN I-I. COX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
-vs.-
EDWARD C. CARLISLE, Mayor of Case No. 9242 
Manti City, MANTI CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation, Henry Henningson, John 
Mcintosh and Ed Nielson, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND· APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fences fell and the Manti City grader plowed its· way 
across the neatly furrowed farmland. Manti City was open-
ing up a platted street outside the Manti city limits, which 
the Plaintiff and her predecessors had been farming for 
several generations. 
Immediately upon obtaining notice of the heavy equip-
ment's invasion, Plaintiff filed suit to prevent the trespass 
and obtain damages for the injury to the growing crops, the 
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destroyep. leveled farm land and the engineered irrigation 
system. 
Trial was held on .l\'lay 28, 1959, in the District Court 
in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah. The Court dis-
missed the Plaintiff-Appellant's action and declared that the 
Defendant-Respondent Manti City was the owner of the 66 
foot strip of land located between Plaintiff-Appellant's Par-
cels 99 and 113, Plat "A" Manti City Survey, and that said 
strip of land was a· public road. 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree in 
favor of . · the several Defendants-Respondents entered· and 
filed on February 26, 1960, based upon the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
For convenience, the parties will be referred to as 
they appeared in the Court below. 
PLEADINGS 
The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff is the owner 
of Parcel 99 and Parcel 113 and all land located between said 
Parcels in Plat "A", Manti City Survey, Sanpete County, 
Utah. 
It further states that Defendants unlawfully without 
Plaintiff's consent and against her repeated protests, entered 
upon her farm, destroyed her fences, crushed and damaged 
the crops planted thereon, and destroyed the leveled grade 
and engineered irrigation system on said land. 
The Plaintiff asked the Court for a restraining order 
to prevent the Defendant Manti City from building a road 
on the strip of land farmed by Plaintiff, for $1,000.00 special 
damages and $5,000.00 general damages. 
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The Defendant's answered Plaintiff's complaint by 
claiming ownership of the strip of land between Parcels 99 
and 113, in that the said strip of land was laid out and dedi-
cated as a public street as shown on the official Plat of 
Manti City. 
EVIDENCE 
The Defendant Manti City is an Incorporated City of 
the third class in Sanpete County, Utah. The Plaintiff is 
the owner of an 80 acre farm which includes Parcels 99 and 
113 and the strip of land between them, said farm being 
located north of the City limits. The official plat of Manti 
City shows a 66 foot wide public road between the said 
Parcels 99 and 113. 
It was stipulated that taxes had not been paid on the 
said 66 foot strip of land. It was Plaintiff's evidence that 
the premises had always been part of Plaintiff and her pre-
decessors farm. 
Parcel 113 was deeded to William A. Cox on Decem-
ber 21, 1871, from Luther T. Tuttle, Mayor of Manti City. 
Parcel 99 was deeded to William Bench on December 14, 
1871, from Luther 'r. Tuttle, Mayor Manti City. Both of these 
conveyances were made pursuant to the act of the Utah 
Legislature of February 17, 1869, (Compiled Laws of 1869, 
Sec. 1166 et seq.) and an act of Congress of March 2, 1867. 
The Mayor of Manti received Title to all the land 
(both Parcels 99 and 113 and the strip between) in trust 
for the several use and benefit of the occupants of the said 
City by a patent from the United States of America dated 
September 2, 1872. This patent was issued pursuant to the 
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provisions of the Federal Townsite Act of 1867 (Act of 
March 2, 1867, 14th Stat. 541, 43 USCA, 718.) 
Manti City had been settled and occcupied as a Town-
site for many years having been incorporated in 1851 under 
the laws of the Territory of Utah. 
On January 25, 1892, the official Plat of Manti City 
prepared in February of 1871, was adopted. It showed that 
Parcels 99 and 113, Plat "A" Manti City Survey, were separ-
ated by a road 66 feet wide and 759 feet long. 
The Defendants-Respondents rely upon the official 
plat to prove their title to the said strip of land. They also 
introduced testimony from three witnesses to prove that the 
public once used this road. Plaintiff-Appellant believes that 
the witnesses testimony does not show there was ever a road 
on the land in question. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant introduced testimony showing 
that for over 70 years there has never been a road on the 
said land and that the land was always used as part of the 
farm of Plaintiff and her predecessors in interest. 
The Plaintiff also introduced in evidence to prove 
there never was a road in existence, Civil Case No. 786, in 
the District Court in and for Sanpete County, Utah, which 
case resulted in a Decree disconnecting and detaching this 
and other property from the city limits of Manti. This case 
was commenced in 1910 by a Petition signed by 43 owners 
of real property located immediately north of the City which 
included the owners of Parcels 99 and 113. All of these 
landowners and citizens of Manti stated there were no streets, 
alleys, sidewalks, or any public improvements on any of said 
premises to be detached and disconnected from the City. The 
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effect of these ancient documents is to show that there was 
no road between Parcels 99 and 113. It is also interesting 
to note that the map of the area to be disconnected makes a 
jag to take in this specific property, namely Parcels 99 and 
113 and the strip of land located between the said parcels. 
To prove there once was a road, the Defendants-Re-
spondents called the following witnesses: 
First: William T. Hall, an 80 year old resident of Manti 
who died soon after this testimony, stated that he could 
remember when the land in question as well as land located 
further north was not separated by fences and that there 
were bars to get into the premises. He stated that all of 
the land was used as a community cow range. He testified 
that there was a public road over the premises, but on Cross-
examination on page 39 he stated: 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) So that, in other word, 
there wasn't any definite markings of a 
road. It was merely a couple of gates 
through the field? 
Answer: Well, that is right. That is right. 
MR. TIBBS: That is all. 
THE WITNESS: There were just bars. 
MR. WOOLLEY: That is all then." 
Second: Defendants-Respondents also relied on the 
testimony of Fred W. Cox who testified there once was a 
road between the two Parcels. He is the same Fred W. Cox 
who signed the Petition in Civil Case No. 786 in 1910 as pre-
viously referred to, which stated in effect that there was no 
road over the premises. 
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On page 107 on Direct-examination, he testified where 
the road went through the premises. 
"Question: (By Mr. Woolley) State whether or not 
there was any bars in that fence? 
Answer: There was bars down by Uncle Haze Clark's 
Stack yard. 
Question: Were there any bars in that fence near the 
cemetery corner: that far south? 
Answer: No. Not that I ever remember. 
Question: You don't remember those? 
Answer: No. We came down to the bottom of Parcel 
99 and then went right out through these bars. 
Question: What bars are you talking about? 
Answer Well, the bars ove-r next to the cemetery 
line here to where Uncle Haze Clark's stack 
yard was. We came right out on the south side 
of his stack yard and come in to the lane across 
from over to the bottom of Parcel 99." 
Consequently, the road he described, if any, was not 
on the strip of land between parcel 99 and 113, but located 
on the land farther to the north. It is worth noting in regards 
to this testimony that the "Uncle Haze Clark" referred to, 
is the same person as H. R. Clark, the witness for the Plain-
tiff, who testified there has never been a road over the strip 
of land between Parcels 99 and 113. 
Third: The Defendant Manti City also relied on Will-
iam Ambrose Tuttle to prove there was a public road. 
He testified on page 126 about the gates being located 
on the Clark premises. 
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''Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) You mentioned getting out 
of the gates down by Mr. Clark's premises, 
didn't you? 
Answer: There was bars. There was not gates. 
Question: The bars? 
Answer: That is right. 
Question: That was on the east fence? 
Answer: That is right. That runs north. 
MR. TIBBS: I call the court's atten-
tion to the fact that the Clark premises are not the premises 
known as 113 or 99. They are premises further to the north. 
quainted, of course 
THE COURT: That is my impression. 
THE WITNESS:. Well, I am not ac-
Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Just one other question, 
Ambrose, excuse me. But I know you well, too. 
You have gone through ditches and over lanes, 
through all of the dogon farm land around here, 
haven't you· 
Answer: Yes, sir." 
On page 125 Mr. Tuttle also testified that he never 
saw anyone go over the strip of land between Parcels 99 
and 113. 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) How old were you then? 
Answer: I was about six years old. I would say 
about '96 when it was. As I have stated, I am 
seventy-three, will be on the first day of August. 
Question: Did you ever see anybody else travel 
through there? 
Answer: No, sir. I never did. 
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Question: Drive cattle through? 
Answer: No. I don't know anybody ever drove cattle 
through. As I say, I am not acquainted and not 
prepared to argue or make any statements on 
that." 
The Plaintiff-Appellant to prove there was never a 
road located between Parcels 99 and 113 called Dr. H. R. 
Clark, a lifetime resident of Manti, whose family owned the 
premises immediately to the north of Parcel 113 and who 
has been familiar with Parcel 99 and 113 for over 70 years. 
He testified on page 77 as follows: 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) So you can nearly remem-
ber back seventy years, is that correct? 
Answer: Yes, sir. I herded cows up and down that 
lane all my young life. 
Question: Now that lane is the lane between the Cox 
farm - -
Answer: And the cemetery. 
Question: The cemetery. Dr. Clark, during this time 
do you ever remember of a public road traveling 
from the cemetery lane, if you want to call it 
that, west across the Grant Cox farm? 
Answer: No, sir. There never 'was a road there. 
Question: Do you ever remember the public travers-
ing that, those - -
Answer: No, sir. They never did. 
Question: - - lands? Did you ever remember a road 
being fenced over those lands· 
Answer: No, I don't. 
Question: During this time has, have those lands been 
used for farming purposes? 
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Answer: Always. As near as I know. 
Question: Have they always been occupied by farmers? 
Answer: Yes, sir. 
Question: Has there ever been strips running east and 
west that weren't farmed or weren't occupied 
by the farmers that were occupying the land"? 
Answer: No, sir." 
The Plaintiff's family owned the Parcels in question 
and on page 59 she testified concerning her knowledge of 
the premises. 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Have you been familiar 
with this land for the past forty years then? 
Answer: I think I could say that I have been. 
Question: During that time, Mrs. Cox, has there ever 
been a road over that land? 
Answer: Not to my recollection. 
Question: Have you ever seen the public cross that 
land at any place going from east to west? 
Answer: Not that I remember of. As I remember it, 
our ten acres joined right on the land owned by 
Mr. Henry that was right to the bottom of our 
farm, of our top ten acres, and there was will-
ows, and, of course, the fence, and then there 
was willows and shrubs along the bottom. Not 
shrubs, but willows, rose bushes, things of that 
nature, that was along the bottom of the fence. 
Question: Did you subsequently come into possession 
of the property that you designate owned by 
Mr. Henry? 
Answer: Yes. My father bought it from Mr. Henry." 
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On page 92 Grant Cox, the husband of the Plaintiff, 
testified concerning his knowledge that there was not a 
road over the premises. 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Since you've been familiar 
with this land and since you have owned this 
land has there, has anyone ever had possession 
of a strip of land across, crossing this farm other 
than the occupant of the premises, Parcel 99, 
Parcel 113? 
Answer: Nobody has ever had access to that land 
except us." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The main question involved is whether or not Manti 
City should be prevented from building a road over a platted 
street outside the City limits, which land has been used and 
improved as part of the Plaintiff's farming operation. 
In the Trial Court the Plaintiff argued two points: 
1. That under the Federal Townsite acts of March 2, 
1867, the Mayor of Manti was given title to the land, 
in Trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants 
thereof, according to their respective interests. The Plaintiff 
relies on the Deed from the Mayor of Manti City dated 
December 14, 1871, recorded May 12, 1874, as to Parcel 99, 
and on the Deed dated December 21, 1871, recorded January 
10, 1872, as to Parcel 113. Plaintiff contends that because 
these Deeds are dated prior to the time the Mayor of Manti 
received the premises in trust, it shows that the premises. 
both Parcels 99 and 113, and the strip between them, were 
occupied prior to the time the Mayor received the patent. 
10 
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2. That in the event the Court did not hold that the 
strip of land located between Parcel 99 and Parcel 113 was 
held in trust for the Plaintiff or her predecessors who were 
occupiers of said land then the Plaintiff contends the City 
is estopped to open up the road because of the exceptional 
circumstances involved and because equity and justice re-
quires that the municipality be precluded from causing 
irrepairable injury to this plaintiff who honestly and in good 
faith and acting because of the City's conduct made the val-
uable improvements to the entire 80 acre farm by leveling 
and placing an engineered irrigation system on same. 
SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
FO·R A REVERSAL OF THE 
JUDGMENT APPEALED FRO·M 
The errors upon which the Appellant relies for the 
reversal of the Judgment appealed from are: 
POINT I 
BECAUSE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTAN-
CES INVOLVED THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO USE THE DOCTRINE OF ESTO·PPEL TO PRE-
VENT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MANTI CITY 
FROM O·PENING THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND 
USED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S FARM 
AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
p·oiNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 8, WHERE IT FOUND· THAT 
THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND BETWEEN PAR-
CELS 99 AND 113, PLAT "A" lVIANTI CITY SURVEY, 
HAD BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
11 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 9, WHERE IT FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF OR HER PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST 
WERE NOT IN OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID 66 FOOT 
WIDE STRIP OF LAND AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY 
UPON THE LAND· BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITIES 
OF MANTI CITY. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 10, WHEN IT HELD THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP WAS OCCUPIED 
BY ANY PRIVATE PERSON AT ANY TIME· PRIOR TO 
THE DATE OF THE PATENT TO LUTHER T. TUTTLE, 
MAYOR OF MANTI, AND THAT IF THE 66 FOOT WIDE 
STRIP WAS NOT BEING USED AS A PUBLIC STREET 
AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY, IT WAS VACANT AND 
UNOCCUPIED, AND ON JANUARY 25, 1892, WAS DE-
DICATED AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 12, WHEN IT FOUND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT OR 
ANY AB.ANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC STREET BY 
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ARGUMENT 
This is an action in equity and In law. It is either 
admitted in the pleadings or is stipulated by the parties that 
Manti City is a Municipal Corporation, that the Plaintiff 
Ludean H. Cox is the owner and is in possession of Parcel 
99 and Parcel 113, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey. Plat "A" 
of Manti City Survey shows a strip of land between Parcels 
99 and 113 held in the name of Luther Tuttle, Mayor of 
Manti City in trust for the several use and benefit of the 
occupants of the City according to their respective interests. 
It is the Defendants' contention that the· strip of land is a 
road and that they have possession of it. It is Plaintiff's 
contention that they and their predecessors in interest have 
always had the possession of the strip of land between Parcels 
99 and 113, and that said strip of land has always been used 
as a part of the farming operation of Plaintiff and her pre-
decessors. Plaintiff further contends that the City has never 
had possession of said strip of land, that there has never 
been a road located on it. 
Plain tiff's testimony is to the effect that for over 40 
years she has been familiar with the property, and during 
this time there has never been a public road across the 
premises. 
Dr. H. R. Clark, a life long resident of Manti, testified 
that his father owned the land immediately north of Parcel 
113. He testified he could remember for over seventy years, 
and that based upon his memory and familiarity with these 
premises he knew there had never been a public road across 
them, and that the strip of land, if there was one, had always 
been used by the occupants of the land as part of their farm. 
13 
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Grant Cox, husband of the Plaintiff testified that he had 
been farming the premises since approximately 1933, and 
knew that since that time there has never been a road across 
the land. 
The Court admitted in evidence Civil Case No. 786 
in the District Court in and for Sanpete County, wherein a 
Petition was filed by Fred Jensen and others -vs- Manti 
City, praying for the detachment from the City limits of cer-
tain territory, including Parcel 99 and Parcel 113, and the 
strip of land located between them. This Petition was signed 
by over 3/.iths of the farmers owning land immediately north 
of Manti City, including plaintiffs predecessors in interest. 
The Petitioners on March 4, 1910, stated that they were the 
owners of the land immediately to the East and North of the 
boundaries of Manti City, that the land was used for agri-
cultural purposes, that the land was located outside the City 
as indicated by streets and roads, and they stated that the 
land was situated out of and remote from the range of Mun-
icipal benefits, there being no streets, alleys, or sidewalks, 
or any other improvements thereon. They also stated that 
the land had not been utilized or needed for Municipal pur-
poses, and it was entirely unlikely and improbable that the 
City would ever be extended to, or upon said land, or that 
any streets, driveways, or other improvements would ever be 
had or made. 
In response to the Petition an Order was served upon 
Manti City in the same manner as a Summons. A Publica-
tion of Notice was published in the Manti Messenger for ten 
days, and the Default of Manti City was entered on April 
4, 1910. The Court appointed three Commissioners to adjust 
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the terms of the property to be severed, and to determine 
the mutual property rights of the City to the territory to be 
detached. The Commissioners reported there was no property 
belonging to said City, or in which the City had any interest, 
located or situated on or upon the said described territory, 
or any part thereof. This covered Parcels 99 and 113 and the 
66 foot strip of land now claimed by Manti City. The Court 
on May 20, 1910, by A. J. Christensen, Judge, issued an Order 
in pur~uance to the Commissioners' report and prayer, and 
it was ordered that the territory be disconnected and segre-. 
gated from Manti City. 
In comparison with the Plaintiff's evidence the Defen-
dants presented the testimony of three witnesses, namely, 
William Terry Hall, F. W. Cox, and Ambrose Tuttle. 
In analyzing the testimony in the best light favorable 
to the Defendants, Mr. Hall testified that he had travelled 
across this land, and that there was a bar-gate on the West 
end of the William Bench land, and a bar-gate on the Haze 
Clark land, which incidently, Haze Clark is the same as Dr. 
H. R. Clark that testified there had never been a road on the 
premises. Mr. Hall stated that there was a road running West 
from 1st East to the Cannery, that if they wanted to go 
through they lifted the bars down and traveled across the 
land. He knew there was a road because when he was a kid 
he and his father hauled hay across it. He stated other peo-
ple used it, but he couldn't say who. He also stated that he 
went over it to avoid going into Manti City and around to 
5th North and back. He stated that Brother Clark, Mr. 
Bench, Old Mr. Barton and Shomaker never objected. He 
stated that he and his father always respected the rights of 
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the land owners. 
Mr. Fred W. Cox testified that he farmed with his 
father William Arthur Cox ln 1905 or 1906 to 1911. He 
claimed that he had crossed this land on numerous occasions, 
and then stated that the bars of the gates were on the land 
of "Uncle Haze Clark". Viewing his testimony in the best 
light, it appears that he had gone across part of the premises, 
but that the gate was not on the strip of land between Parcel 
99 and Parcel 113, but was farther North on the Clark pro-
perty, North of Parcel113. 
The last witness relied upon by Defendants was Am-
brose Tuttle. He testified that on two different occasions 
he took equipment on the land known as the Cox premises. 
That there was a road on the farm land, and in order to get 
to it from the West he had to cover a deep ditch using 2 
by 4's. He testified he did not .know if it was a public road. 
He also testified that he had gone over most of the roads and 
lanes in Sanpete County and on many individual's farms. 
In reviewing the testimony of all three witnesses, none 
testified there was a fenced road separating Parcel 99 and 
Parcel 113. The witnesses Hall and Cox testified that the 
bar gate on the East of the road was farther North than 
Parcel 113, and consequently they did not have the alleged 
road located where D·efendant Manti City now claims a 
road to be. 
The Trial Court placed the burden of proof on the 
Plaintiff to show an occupancy of the 66 foot strip of land 
between the parcels prior to the date of the Patent. It is 
the contention of the Plaintiff that the burden should have 
been on the Defendant to show that there was a dedicated 
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road between the parcels. Plaintiff contends that before the 
Mayor of Manti City received the Patent from the United 
States Government there were occupants of the premises 
known as Parcel 99 and 113, and consequently the premises 
located between the Parcels. Because of the great length 
of time that has elapsed since 1871, it is impossible for any-
one to obtain witnesses to testify to the occupancy of the 
land before that time. However, Plain tiff has evidence back 
70 years or as long as memory of man and that evidence is 
to the effect there has never been a road over this 66 foot 
strip of land~ 
The Court should also apply the Doctrine of Equitable 
Estopple as was done by our Supreme Court in Wall -vs-
Salt Lake City, (50 Utah 592, 168 Pacific 766) in view of the 
exceptional circumstances involved. The Trial Court distin-
guished Wall -vs- Salt Lake City from the present case be-
cause Plaintiff had failed to show an affirmative act on the 
part of the City as a basis for the Plaintiff's and her pre-
decessors' actions in occupying the said land. The Plaintiff 
contends that the Doctrine of Equitable Estopple cannot be 
subjected to fixed and settled rules of universal application, 
like legal estoppels, or hampered by the narrow confines of 
a technical formula. (19 Am. J ur. 642) The Plaintiff further 
contends that there was such in-action on the part of the 
City under this exceptional state of facts and under the Civil 
Case detaching this property from the City limits to warrant 
Plaintiff's improving the land and the Court to apply the 
Doctrine of Eq ui table Estopple. 
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POINT I 
BECAUSE O·F THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTAN-
CES INVO·LVED THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO USE THE DO·CTRINE OF ESTOPPLE TO· PRE-
VENT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MANTI CITY 
FROM O·PENING THE 66 .FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND 
USED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S LAND 
AS A PUBLIC ROAD. 
Although there is some authority to the contrary, it 
has been more generally held and recognized that under 
some exceptional circumstances a Municipality may be es-
topped to open or use a street or alley heretofore created 
and still existing in point of law, but never opened, or once 
opened and in use, since fallen into disuse and seemingly 
abandoned, and it seems fair to say that the weight of au-
thority sustains the possibility of a Municipality being estop-
ped in this respect. (See 171 ALR Page 98, Wall -vs- Salt 
Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pacific 766). 
The Oregon Court in Dabney -vs- Portland, (124 Ore-
gon 54, 263 Pacific 386) held: 
"No hard and fixed rule can be stated for de-
termining when this principle (Estoppel in pais a-
gainst a municipality) should be applied. Each case 
must be considered in the light of its own particular 
facts and circumstances." 
In 171 ALR 107 it states: 
"Among the cases, there appears to be rather 
general agreement that an equitable estoppel pre-
cluding a municipality from opening or using a public 
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street will arise only under exceptional circumstances 
strongly calling for the application of that doctrine 
to prevent manifest injustice." 
It goes on further to say: 
"One basic requirement for the existence of 
such an estoppel against a municipality is that the 
conduct of the municipality and the situation of the 
one in possession of the street or alley area must, as 
a whole, be such that it would be clearly inequit-
able to allow the municipality to open the street and 
destroy and remove the private improvements." 
Plaintiff believes that this is a case where justice 
should require the Defendant-Respondent be estopped from 
opening the alleged road. There is no evidence that there 
was ever a fenced or an improved street or any houses or 
buildings located near it. The testimony of the nearest neigh-
bor, who has been familiar with the property his entire life 
(over seventy years) was that there has never been a road 
or a street where Defendant contends it is located and that 
the strip of land has never been used by the public 
The evidence is to the effect that as long as man can 
remember the strip of land between the Parcels has been 
used as part of the Plaintiff and her predecessors' farm. 
There is also so the ancient case, Civil Case No. 786, filed 
in the District Court in and for Sanpete County, namely 
Fred Jensen and others -vs- Manti City, for the detachment 
of land North of Manti from the City limits. This action was 
commenced by a Petition signed by more than 3/t!ths of the 
farmers owning land in the vicinity. This Petition in 1910 
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stated that the land was situated out of and remote from the 
range of municipal benefits, there being no streets, alleys, or 
sidewalks or any other public improvements therein. The 
Court adopted the report of the Commissioners, wherein 
they reported there was no property belonging to said City 
or in which the City had any interest. 
Over 30 years elapsed after the Court's Decree 
and the Plaintiff went to great expense in making im-
provements on the premises in accordance with good farm-
ing procedures. The entire 80 acre farm of the Plaintiff was 
leveled and an engineered cement irrigation system was in-
stalled at a cost in excess of $15,000.00, in order that the 
utmost benefit could be derived from the irrigation water 
available for the said farm. The leveling and irrigation sys-
tem greatly inhanced the value of the farm. When the 
Defendant-Respondent made its swath through the farm with 
the grader, it destroyed the grade for the irrigation system 
and the entire 80 acre farming operation of Plaintiff was 
substantially damaged. Plaintiff contends that when the 
Municipality failed to contest the allegations in the Detach-
ment Proceedings, Civil Case No. 786, its negative conduct 
was even stronger than the affirmative conduct of the City 
in the case of Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, and that such nega-
tive conduct was of a type which would mislead and induce 
the Plaintiff to place the improvements on this farm and con-
sequently on this strip of land under a claim of right and 
in good faith. Plaintiff-Appellant contends that these facts 
present a strong basis for an estoppel precluding the Muni-
cipality from opening up this strip of land as a road. 
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In Boise City -vs- Wilkinson (16 Idaho 150, 102 Pacific 
148) the Court applied the Doctrine of Estoppel: 
"We recognize that, as a general rule, the doc-
trine of estoppel does not apply to municipal corpor-
ations, and we are not unmindful of the fact that the 
courts of many states have absolutely refused to 
apply it to such corporations. We are not prepared, 
however, to announce an unalterable and unexcep-
tionable rule in this state, which would inevitably re-
sult in perpetrating wrong and injustice in exception-
al cases like this. Courts of equity are established for 
the administration of justice in those peculiar cases 
where substantial justice cannot be administered un-
der the express rules of law, and to adopt a rigid rule 
that recognizes no exception would be to rob such 
courts of much of their efficacy and power for ad-
ministering even-handed justice. The people in their 
collective and soverign capacity ought to observe the 
same rules and standard of honesty and fair dealing 
that is expected of a private citizen. In their collec-
tive and governmental capacity they should no more 
be allowed to 1 ull the citizen to repose and confidence 
in what would otherwise be a false and erroneous 
position than should the private citizen." 
In our case we are not concerned with a street where 
there are houses and barns located next thereto, but with 
a strip of land outside of the City limits which has been ~sed 
and improved as part of an irrigated farm. 
In Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, (50 Utah 593, 168 Pacific 
766) this Court held that: 
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"Whether or not the ground in dispute was a 
platted street at the time the town site was entered, 
and whether or not it was platted at that time and 
recognized by persons conveying adjacent property, 
and whether or not occupants of the land, in pre-
senting their claims to the probate court, by not 
claiming certain ground platted as streets, thereby 
abandoned any right they may have had or became 
barred by the statute of limitations, and whether or 
not the federal grant under which the town site was 
entered should be construed one way or the other, 
are questions which are not in the least degree con-
trolling in view of the conclusion at which we have 
arrived." 
The Court then went on to say that the question is: 
"Whether or not the Defendant City is es-
topped by reason of its own conduct from now claim-
ing title to the property in question." 
The Court held that the Defendant by its acts, con-
ducts and representations was estopped in setting up any 
claim whatsoever to said property, or any part thereof, for 
any purpose whatsoever. The Court held that a Municipal 
Corporation can no more profit by fraud upon property 
owners than an individual, and may be estopped by its 
conduct. 
In Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, 21 years had elapsed 
from the first adoption of the Plat of Freemont Heights be-
fore the Defendant suddenly entered upon the premises and 
commenced work which finally culminated in the commence-
ment of the action. Our Supreme Court held rightly that 
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it was its duty to decide as right and justice required. In 
our present case over 40 years have elapsed since anyone 
other than the owners went over the premises, and examining 
all the evidence together, it is very doubtful if anyone other 
than the Surveyor intended a road to go over this strip of 
land, and certainly there has been no road over the premises 
as long as man can remember. 
In Washington -vs- Walla Walla (3 Washington 68, 
13 Pacific 408) the Court stated: 
"On the entry of lands, the interest .of the 
public attached to those streets and alleys which 
exist as a fact at the time of the entry, either by 
actual use or by consent and acquiesence of the 
occupants affected, and not streets or lots laid out 
upon paper to which the occupant has never given 
his consent." 
In examining the cases, it is true that they exhibit 
considerable differences in theory and in application of the-
ory. This Plaintiff believes that each case must be consid-
ered based upon its own facts. In this case, Manti City's fail-
ure to con test the partition action and to show there were 
allegedly streets within the area partitioned is such inaction 
as to wrongfully mislead the Plaintiff into believing that she 
could make the improvements on the land. Of course, it is 
the Plaintiff's contention that the City did not take any 
action because there never was a street and there was never 
an intent to have a street at this location. 
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In 171 ALR 110 it also states: 
According to one substantial line of authority, 
an estoppel to open or use a street may arise where 
there is long-continued non-user by the Municipal-
ity, together with possession of the street area by 
private parties acting in good faith and in the belief 
that its use or once intended use as a street had 
been abandoned, and their erection of valuable im-
provements thereon without objection from the Mun-
icapility, which has knowledge thereof and the sit-
uation is such that to permit the Municipality to 
reclaim the land would result in great damage to 
those in possession. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 8, WHERE IT FOUND THAT 
THE 66 FO~OT WIDE STRIP OF LAND BETWEEN PAR-
CELS 99 AND 113, PLAT "A" MANTI CITY SURVEY, 
HAD BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
There is no evidence that there has ever been a fenced 
road on this strip of land and the testimony upon which the 
Court based this finding did not even have the alleged road 
on the strip of land involved. According to the testimony of 
the Defendants-Respondent's witnesses, the only traveling 
on the alleged road was when there were bar gates to get 
in the large cow pasture. The East bar gate was not located 
between the Parcels 99 and 113 which are on each side of 
the strip of land in question. Contrary to the Court's find-
ings, Dr. H. R. Clark of Manti, who has been familiar with 
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this land for over 70 years testified that there has never 
been a road over the premises. It is the Plaintiff's conten-
tion, consequently, that the Trial Court erred in making its 
finding that this strip of land had been used as a public 
street. Also the Plaintiff once again calls the Court's atten-
tion to the 43 signers of the Petition in the District Court 
of Sanpete County, Civil Case No. 786, who stated there had 
never been a road across said premises and there was not 
a road across the premises in 1910. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS O·F FACT NUMBER 9, WHERE IT FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF OR HER PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST 
WERE NOT IN OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID 66 FOO·T 
STRIP O·F LAND AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY UPON 
THE LAND BY THE' CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF 
MANTI CITY. 
This finding is not based on any evidence in this 
record. The Terri to rial Townsite Act recognized the neces-
sity of having streets and authorized the proper authorities 
to designate such grounds as were at the time of the entry 
in the land office being so used for public use and to hold 
title thereof for such public use absolutely, but the acts did 
not authorize the Corporate authorities to designate for 
public use lands which at the time of the entry were being 
occupied for private purposes, and thereafter hold the title 
thereto absolute and without consent of the occupant. Plain-
tiff contends that because the Deeds from the Mayor of 
Manti City, dated December 14, 1871, recorded March 12, 
1874 on Parcel 99, and Deed dated December 21, 1871, re-
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corded January 10, 1872, as to Parcel 113, is prior to the 
date of the patent is evidence to the effect that the farm 
lands involved including the strip between them were occu-
pied prior to the patent. The mere fact that the Plaintiff's 
predecessor had not been adjudged to be the owner of the 
strip of land was not an adjudication of said strip of land 
between the Parcels in the event there was not a public 
road on it at that time and Plaintiff contends the Mayor is 
still holding title to said strip of land in trust for the occu-
pants of said land. 
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Trial Court in mak-
ing this finding, put the burden of showing who was in 
occupany of the 66 foot strip of land on the Plaintiff, when 
in truth and in fact the burden should have been on the 
Defendant to show a dedication of the street. 
Plaintiff does not feel that this Supreme Court should 
hold in the case of Hall -vs- North Ogden City that the city 
was holding the property in trust for the occupants of the 
land and then distinguish the Hall case from the present 
situation because the memory of man does not go back far 
enough. There is no question but that this land (alleged 
road) has been occupied as part of the farm of plaintiff for 
in excess of 70 years. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 10, WHEN IT HELD THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE: 66 FOOT STRIP WAS_ OCCUPIED. BY 
ANY PRIVATE PERSON AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE 
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DATE OF THE PATENT TO LUTHER T. TUTTLE, MAY-
OR OF MANTI CITY, AND THAT IF THE 66 FOOT STRIP 
WAS NOT BEING USED AS A PUBLIC STRE'ET AT THE 
TIME OF THE ENTRY, IT WAS VACANT AND UNOCCU-
PIED, AND· ON JANUARY 25, 1892, WAS DEDICATED 
AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
The Court held in Hall et al -vs- North Ogden City 
et al, that there must be a dedication to have a public street. 
On page 341 the Court said: 
"Before a dedication of a street to the public 
use can be effected, there must be an intention to so 
dedicate such lands on the part of the owner thereof 
or he must act in such manner as to be estopped 
from denying such intention. Such intention may be 
shown either by oral or written declarations or it 
may be inferred from the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances of the case but in all cases such intention 
must be clearly manifested." 
The Trial Court held in the present case tha~ if the 
66 foot strip of land was not being used as a public street 
at the time of the entry, it was vacant and unoccupied. This 
in spite of the fact that the lands on both sides of it was 
being farmed. Dr. Clark's memory goes back to 1892 and 
he says there was no road on the premises at that time. 
It also was held by the Court in Hall et al -vs- North 
Ogden City et al on page 341 that the filing of the Plat did 
not prove an intention on the part of the owners to dedicate 
streets platted therein to public use, in absence of a showing 
that the owners had anything to do with the preparing or 
filing of the Plat. 
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The Court further held in Hall -vs- Salt Lake City: 
"The mere conveyance by the owner of a tract 
of land describing it by reference to a map or plat 
thereof without the other elements above mentioned 
neither shows an intention to dedicate the streets 
therein platted nor estops the owner from dtnying 
such intention." 
.In our case there is no evidence of any oral or written 
declarations of any occupant at any time. The dedication 
must be inferred from the surrounding facts and circum-
stances and according to Hall et al -vs- North Ogden City 
et al, the intention must be clearly manifested. There is no 
evidence that the owners had anything to do with preparing 
or filing the Plat, so the mere filing of the Plat does not 
prove any intention to dedicate and the mere fact that the 
conveyances were made with references to the Plat does 
not show an intention to dedicate or estop the occupants 
from denying such intention. 
POINTV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 12, WHEN IT FOUND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT OR 
ANY ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC STREET BY 
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There is no evidence of there ever having been a 
public street on the said strip of land and if there has 
never been a public street, there never could be an aban-
donment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff-Appellant LuDean H. Cox, submits that 
the decision of the Court based upon its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law is in error. The questions before 
this Court are: 
First: Are the particular facts and circumstances in 
this case such that it would be clearly inequitable to allow 
the Municipality to open the street and destroy the im-
provements; and 
Second: Where the great preponderence of the evi-
dence is to the effect there has never been a road across 
the strip of land, will the mere fact that it is platted road 
be sufficient to warrant the Municipality to open up this 
land for a road outside the City limits when it has been 
used as part of a farm in excess of 7 0 years? 
The Judgment should be reversed and this Court 
should hold that there is not one rule of morals for a M un-
icipality and another for an individual, that the Doctrine of 
Equitable Estoppel should not be subject to fixed and settled 
rules of universal application hampered by the narrow con-
fines of a technical formula, and that instead each case 
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The Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this 
case and cause be remanded to the Court below with in-
structions that the Court prevent the City from entering 
the premises and the Court fix the damages caused to the 
Plaintiff based upon the evidence submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Don V. Tibbs, 
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